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I. INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Amendment guarantee against subjecting a criminal
defendant to double jeopardy for the "same offence"' is a source of great
confusion and division among judges, lawyers, and legal scholars.
Much of the confusion stems from attempts by the United States
Supreme Court to apply a single test to multiple punishments for the
same offense, successive prosecutions for the same offense after acquit-
tal, and repeated prosecutions for the same offense after conviction.2 In
1990, in Grady v. Corbin,3 the Court significantly expanded the scope of
double jeopardy protection against successive prosecutions by adding an
additional prong to the traditional "same elements" test.4 The "same
elements," or "Blockburger," test requires that a prosecution for a sec-
ond offense contain an element that was not an element of the previously
prosecuted offense.' Grady added a "same conduct" standard, which
provided that if the State, in order to establish an essential element of a
crime, must prove conduct for which the defendant already has been
1. The Double Jeopardy Clause states: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
3. 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
4. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
5. Id.
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prosecuted, the Fifth Amendment bars the prosecution.6 Recently, in
United States v. Dixon,7 the Court overturned the Grady test because it
"lacked constitutional roots" and produced confusion.8 This Note ana-
lyzes the practical and theoretical significance of this unusually sudden
reversal of Supreme Court precedent.
Part II of this Note surveys the line of cases that attempted to define
what constitutes a "same offense" under the Fifth Amendment. Part III
details the factual background and divided holding of Dixon. Part IV
analyzes and compares the theoretical soundness of the majority, con-
curring, and dissenting opinions in Dixon, as well as the practical reper-
cussions of Grady before its reversal. Part V concludes that although
the "same conduct" test was flawed, the Court did not give lower courts
enough time or guidance to develop a workable alternative standard.
The Dixon Court's fractured holding does not meet the majority's stated
goal of creating a clear standard, and the Court abandoned important
Fifth Amendment protections by allowing the State to prosecute multi-
ple times for essentially the same illegal act.
II. HISTORY OF "SAME OFFENSE"
The Court's historical difficulty in defining "same offense" under
the Fifth Amendment has been influenced by the changing relationship
between the judiciary and the legislature. The dramatic increase in over-
lapping and similar criminal offenses substantially increased the risk that
a defendant would be subject to multiple prosecutions for the same con-
duct.9 The numerous tests and exceptions created in the attempt to
define "same conduct" reflect the Court's struggle to determine not only
whether two offenses are sufficiently similar to trigger Fifth Amendment
protection, but also where the fundamental balance of power between
the judicial and legislative branches should lie.
The traditional definition of "same offense" was enunciated in
Blockburger v. United States,'0 in which the Court upheld multiple con-
victions of a defendant for selling morphine without a written order and
selling morphine after removing it from its original package." This
''same elements" test consisted of an inquiry into whether either of two
statutes requires "proof of an additional fact which the other does not."' 2
Thus, the Blockburger Court focused exclusively on the separate ele-
6. Grady, 495 U.S. at 510.
7. 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
8. Id. at 2860.
9. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 n.10 (1970).
10. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
11. Id. at 300.
12. Id. at 304. The Court based this proposition on Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338,
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ments of the crimes without regard to the fact that a single act violated
both statutes. 3 The Court noted that if the cumulative penalties seemed
unduly harsh, "the remedy must be afforded by act of Congress, not by
judicial legislation under the guise of construction."14 While Block-
burger remained the sole double jeopardy test for more than fifty years,
it is significant that at its inception far fewer distinct criminal statutes
existed than at present.15 The attempts to reconcile a definition based on
statutory distinction with the explosion of criminal legislation in the
twentieth century caused much of the well-documented confusion in
double jeopardy jurisprudence.16
The Blockburger test, because it originally applied only to cumula-
tive punishments,' 7 spawned confusion when applied to multiple prose-
cutions as well. The Court, however, extended the test to include cases
involving multiple prosecutions for similar offenses, even though this
raised a separate set of double jeopardy concerns. 18
The strands of double jeopardy analysis for multiple punishment
and multiple prosecutions split in Missouri v. Hunter.19 The Hunter
Court significantly reinterpreted Blockburger to be a rule of statutory
construction rather than a test to determine a constitutional right.2 ° The
Court upheld a conviction for armed robbery and armed criminal action,
reasoning that two statutes with the same elements create only a rebutta-
ble presumption that the legislature did not intend cumulative punish-
ments.2' This decision significantly narrowed the protection of
Blockburger by allowing the legislature, in effect, to override the Fifth
343 (1911). Gavieres arguably holds that double jeopardy analysis should not extend beyond
statutory comparisons in the context of multiple prosecutions.
13. A hypothetical can clarify this test: A defendant commits an unlawful act that violates
statutes A and B. Statute A contains elements X and Y and statute B contains elements Y and Z.
The two offenses are distinct because despite arising from the same act they require different
elements of proof. Conversely, if statutes A and B each contained elements X, Y, and Z, then
Blockburger would bar conviction for both offenses because they are technically the same offense.
See, e.g., United States v. Bennett, 702 F.2d 833, 835 (9th Cir. 1983). Bennett also held that
Blockburger may be satisfied despite substantial evidentiary overlap. Id.
14. 284 U.S. at 305.
15. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. at 445 n.10.
16. See, e.g., Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981) (describing double
jeopardy case law as "a veritable Sargasso Sea").
17. Cumulative punishment refers to the imposition of separate penalties for separate offenses
arising out of a single criminal transaction. See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 860 n.7
(1985).
18. In a case decided before Blockburger, the Court indicated that the Fifth Amendment
protected against multiple prosecutions following acquittal by a different sovereign for the same
conduct. In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889).
19. 459 U.S. 359 (1983).
20. Id. at 368-69.
21. Id. at 366-69.
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Amendment merely by indicating its intent to impose multiple punish-
ments."2 This reinterpretation of Blockburger in the multiple punish-
ment context added further difficulty to fashioning a coherent
application of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 3
A. Exceptions to Blockburger
The dangers of multiple prosecutions differ from the dangers of
multiple punishments. Repeated attempts to convict a defendant cause
embarrassment, expense, and a continuing state of anxiety and insecu-
rity. 24 A second prosecution also increases the risk of a wrongful convic-
tion by allowing the State to rehearse its presentation of proof.25 These
concerns led to several exceptions to the strict Blockburger analysis in
multiple prosecution context.
The Court initially recognized the need for greater protection
against multiple prosecutions by creating a "collateral estoppel" excep-.
tion to Blockburger, in Ashe v. Swenson.26 In Ashe, a jury acquitted the
defendant of a gang robbery of one of six poker players.27 A central
issue at the trial was the robber's identity.28 The State then prosecuted
the defendant for the robbery of a different poker player at the same
game."9 Under Blockburger, the second prosecution is allowable
because different victims create a distinction in the elements of proof. In
fact, the defendant could have been prosecuted six separate times for the
same act against separate victims. The Ashe Court responded by
expanding double jeopardy analysis to include a factual comparison of
the two proceedings.3 ° If the first trial resulted in an acquittal based on
the resolution of a factual issue that was an essential element of the
charge, the State was precluded from relitigating the issue under the doc-
trine of "collateral estoppel."31
Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion, suggested that the Court
needed to go further to give substance to the Double Jeopardy Clause in
modern criminal procedure. He advocated a "same transaction" test that
required prosecutors to join all charges arising out of a single act in a
22. See Thomas J. Hickey, Double Jeopardy After Grady v. Corbin, 28 CRIM. L. BULL. 3, 12-
15 (1992).
23. Id. at 15.
24. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
25. See, e.g., Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41 (1982); Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464,
467 (1958).
26. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
27. Id. at 438-39.
28. Id. at 438.
29. Id. at 439.
30. Id. at 444.
31. Id. at 443-44.
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single proceeding. 32 Brennan argued that only this standard would pro-
tect defendants from vexatious multiple prosecutions and promote judi-
cial economy and convenience.33 Although Brennan advocated this
position in numerous cases, a majority of the Court has always consid-
ered the test too broad.34
The Court, in Brown v. Ohio,35 further expanded the scope of
double jeopardy protection to include an exception for consecutive pros-
ecutions of greater and lesser offenses by analogizing similar offenses to
"lesser included offenses." Under Blockburger, a greater offense could
be tried after a lesser offense because of the existence of an additional
element. The Brown Court held that a greater and a lesser included
offense are the "same offense" when the same facts would prove both
offenses. 36 Except in situations where the State could not have found
evidence of the greater offense, prosecution for a greater offense after
prosecution for a lesser offense was barred.37
In Harris v. Oklahoma,38 the Court extended the exception to
include barring prosecution for a lesser offense after prosecution for a
greater offense. The significance of this decision hinges on the Court's
expansion of lesser included offenses to include offenses with statutorily
distinct elements. The defendant was convicted of felony murder based
on an underlying charge of armed robbery, and was also convicted of the
robbery charge. 9 Although robbery is not a literal element of felony
murder, the Court held that conviction for a greater crime bars prosecu-
tion for a lesser one where conviction of the greater cannot be had with-
out conviction of the lesser.4 °
In Illinois v. Vitale,4' the Court took a tentative step toward adding
a significant second tier of protection against multiple prosecutions. The
32. Id. at 454-55 (Brennan, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 454.
34. See Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 790 (1985) (refusing to adopt a "single
transaction" view of the Double Jeopardy Clause). Justice Scalia argued in his Grady dissent that
the Court was adopting a functional version of the "same transaction" test. Grady v. Corbin, 495
U.S. 508, 543 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Grady did not survive long enough to see whether
Scalia was correct.
35. 432 U.S. 161 (1977). In Brown, the defendant was charged under Ohio's "joyriding"
statute which stated: "No person shall purposely take, operate, or keep any motor vehicle without
the consent of its owner." Id. at 162 n. 1. After pleading guilty to this charge and serving prison
time, Brown was charged with and convicted of auto theft stemming from the same event. Id. at
162-63. The Supreme Court held that "joyriding" was actually a lesser included offense of Ohio's
auto-theft statute. Id. at 168.
36. Id. at 169.
37. Id. at 169 n.7.
38. 433 U.S. 682 (1977). The Brown test was considered dicta until applied in Harris.
39. Id. at 682.
40. Id.
41. 447 U.S. 410 (1980).
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defendant Vitale struck and killed two children while driving, and he
received a traffic citation for "failing to reduce speed to avoid an acci-
dent."42 After a bench trial, he was convicted and sentenced to pay a
$15 fine.43 Subsequently, Vitale was charged with two counts of invol-
untary manslaughter." The Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether the second prosecutions were barred by the earlier conviction
based on the "lesser included offense" analysis developed in Harris and
Brown. Whether the second prosecutions passed the Blockburger test-
whether failure to reduce speed was a statutory element of manslaugh-
ter-was unclear.4 5 Justice White, however, writing for the Court, con-
cluded that the analysis does not end with Blockburger.4 6 The Court
remanded the case with specific guidelines:
[I]t may be that to sustain its manslaughter case the State may find it
necessary to prove a failure to slow or to rely on conduct necessarily
involving such failure; it may concede as much prior to trial. In that
case, because Vitale has already been convicted for conduct that is a
necessary element of the more serious crime for which he has been
charged, his claim of double jeopardy would be substantial under
Brown and... Harris ....
This dicta became the foundation of the Grady "same conduct" test.
Vitale shifted the Court away from its statute-based analysis to an
expansion of the fact-based analysis of collateral estoppel. The Harris-
Brown analysis corrected the situation in which a defendant could be
found guilty of exactly the same crime for which he had been previously
acquitted. For example, in a felony-murder case, a jury could find a
defendant guilty of either the underlying felony or the murder. A
defendant who has been acquitted of the underlying felony is thus again
at risk of conviction of that felony.
The Vitale dicta describes the danger of subjecting a defendant to
successive prosecutions involving proof of the same conduct. The Court
remanded the case to the state court precisely because it could not deter-
mine if the State necessarily must use proof of the defendant's failure to
reduce speed in order to prove this particular instance of manslaughter.
If "failure to slow" is necessary to prove manslaughter, Vitale suggests
that under certain circumstances, "failure to slow" may be sufficiently
analogous to a lesser included offense that the statutes are not suffi-
42. Id. at 411. The prosecution was based on an Illinois traffic statute. ILL. REV. STAT., Ch.
95 1/2, § 11-601(a) (1979). Id.
43. Id. at 412.
44. Id. at 413.
45. Id. at 421.
46. Id. at 419.
47. Id. at 420.
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ciently distinct. Yet the Court allowed a second option: If the court
does not find it necessary to prove failure to slow, the State must attempt
to prove the manslaughter charge without offering evidence that would
prove a failure to slow. Thus the Court was attempting to use the evi-
dence offered by the State to determine whether two offenses are consti-
tutionally distinct.4 8 This intermingling of factual and statutory analysis
became a major factor in the ultimate reversal of this test.49
Harris correctly focused on whether the offense was analogous to
an element of the greater offense, and not the manner in which the State
sought to prove its case. The reliance in Vitale on Harris can be justi-
fied only if Harris stands for the broad proposition that courts may go
beyond a literal comparison of statutory elements to determine the
meaning of "same offense."
B. The "Same Conduct" Test
The Court adopted the "same conduct" standard proposed in Vitale
in Grady v. Corbin.i0 The facts of Grady were similar to those of Vitale.
The defendant, a drunken driver, struck two vehicles killing the driver of
one.51 He pleaded guilty in Town Court to two traffic tickets charging
him with driving while intoxicated and failing to keep right of the
median. 2 Through a series of errors "that would have made the Marx
Brothers proud, ' 53 the traffic court prosecutor, unaware of the case
details, recommended a minimum sentence. 54 The presiding judge sen-
tenced the defendant to a $350 fine and revoked his license for six
months. 5 Subsequently, a grand jury indicted Corbin for reckless man-
slaughter, second-degree vehicular homicide, criminally negligent homi-
cide, third-degree reckless assault, and driving while intoxicated 6.5  The
prosecution filed a bill of particulars indicating that the State, in order to
prove the charges, would rely on the defendant's intoxication while driv-
ing, failure to keep on the right of the median, and driving at an unsafe
speed in heavy rain. 7
48. The dissenters in Grady expressed confusion over how the "same conduct" test differed
from the "same evidence" test. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 526-44 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
49. See United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2861-64 (1993).
50. 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
51. Id. at 511.
52. Id. at 511-12.
53. George C. Thomas III. A Modest Proposal to Save the Double Jeopardy Clause, 69
WASH. U. L.Q. 195, 199 (1991).
54. Grady, 495 U.S. at 513.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 513-14.
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Justice Brennan, writing for a 5-4 majority, stated that "the Double
Jeopardy Clause bars any subsequent prosecution in which the govern-
ment, to establish an essential element of an offense charged in that
prosecution, will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the
defendant has already been prosecuted. ' 58 This created a two-step test
for double jeopardy. First, a court must compare the statutory elements
of the offenses in question and apply the Blockburger test to determine
whether the legislature intended separate offenses. 9
Second, a court must apply the "same conduct" test as enunciated
by Brennan. Applying this test to the facts of Grady, the second prose-
cution passes the first step of the analysis because drunken driving and
crossing the median are not always necessary elements of assault or
manslaughter. The prosecution is barred, however, under the "same
conduct" step because the State admitted in its pleadings that it would
prove the conduct that constituted the traffic offenses in order to prove
the elements of the manslaughter offense. The State could have avoided
the double jeopardy bar by relying solely on evidence of some other
conduct, such as driving too fast for the weather, in order to establish
recklessness. This possibility distinguishes the "same conduct" test from
the "same transaction" test that Brennan advocated in Ashe. When there
was no bill of particulars stating the prosecution's theory, Brennan sug-
gested adopting a test that would shift the burden of proof of separate
offenses to the state after a non-frivolous showing by the defendant that
an indictment places him in double jeopardy.6 °
Brennan also distinguished the "same conduct" standard from the
"same evidence" test.6' The "same conduct" test is both broader and
narrower than the "same evidence" test. The "same evidence" standard
disallows the use of particular evidence in successive prosecutions
regardless of what the evidence is being offered to prove. This does not
narrowly protect double jeopardy interests because, for example, testi-
mony regarding the clothing a defendant was wearing on a particular
night may be used to prove separate crimes committed on the same night
without subjecting the defendant to double jeopardy. Since Block-
burger, the Court has repeatedly rejected this standard. The "same con-
58. Id. at 521.
59. Id. The legislative-intent component of the Blockburger test is a new component. See
Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1983).
60. Grady, 495 U.S. at 522 n.14. Brennan noted that all federal circuits had adopted this
system. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Ragins, 840 F.2d 1184, 1192-93 (4th Cir. 1988). Although
Brennan failed to address Scalia's concerns about the defense proving the conduct to force double
jeopardy or what standard of proof the prosecution must meet before the conduct is considered
proved, Grady does not mandate Scalia's result.
61. Grady, 495 U.S. at 521.
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duct" test allows the same evidence to be used to prove different
conduct, but disallows, for example, a different witness testifying to
prove conduct that was previously litigated.
Justice Scalia bitterly criticized this new test for being impossible
to implement without implicitly adopting the "same transaction" test that
had been expressly rejected by the Court.62 He also attacked the test as a
misinterpretation of Brown and Harris, and characterized Vitale as
unsupported dicta.63 He characterized the test as an arbitrary expansion
of the Double Jeopardy Clause because it allows proof of conduct that
constitutes part of an offense, but disallows the same proof when it con-
stitutes an entire offense. 6'
Scalia also disapproved of the Court's reliance on Vitale as prece-
dent, because the Vitale Court merely stated that the defendant would
have a "substantial" claim that double jeopardy barred the second prose-
cution.65 However, this distinction is not persuasive because the Vitale
Court had no reason for remanding the case if it had not intended to find
such a double jeopardy bar in the event that "failing to reduce speed"
was an essential element of proof.
The Supreme Court created an important exception to Grady in
United States v. Felix.66 Lower courts divided on the application of
Grady to prosecutions for conspiracy after prosecutions for the substan-
tive offense that the defendants conspired to commit.6 7 A strict applica-
tion of the "same conduct" test would bar prosecution because the state
would need to prove the underlying conduct. This application overpro-
tects double jeopardy interests in order to prove the conspiracy by
preventing the State from using evidence that is highly persuasive but
not analogous to a lesser included offense.68 It also highlights an incon-
62. See id. at 527 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 537.
64. Id. at 541.
65. See Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 420 (1980).
66. 112 S. Ct. 1377 (1992). The defendant in Felix was convicted of a substantive drug
offense in one trial and subsequently convicted of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine.
Id. at 1379-80.
67. Compare United States v. Calderone, 917 F.2d 717, 721-22 (2d Cir. 1990) (upholding a
double jeopardy claim because the "conduct" at issue in a conspiracy claim is not the agreement
itself, but the acts that the state uses to infer an agreement) and United States v. Gambino, 920
F.2d 1108, 1112 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that Grady bars prosecution for conspiracy following
prosecution for the substantive acts that the defendants allegedly conspired to do) and United
States v. Felix, 926 F.2d 1522 (10th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1377 (1992) with United States
v. Rivera-Feliciano, 930 F.2d 951, 954-55 (1 st Cir. 1991) (determining that double jeopardy does
not bar conspiracy charges based on previously prosecuted conduct) and United States v. Clark,
928 F.2d 639 (4th Cir. 1991).
68. See Grady, 495 U.S. at 524-26 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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sistency between Grady and Dowling v. United States.69 In Dowling,
the Court held that evidence of a crime that the defendant was acquitted
of could be used in a later prosecution to prove identity or method.70
The Felix Court held that the Grady test did not apply to conspiracy
cases because of the established doctrine that conspiracies were distinct
from substantive offenses. 71 The Court's rationale rested on the Court's
historical treatment of conspiracy offenses prior to Grady and a cryptic
message that Grady should not be read too literally. 72 The Court's deci-
sion resolved the main area of post-Grady confusion in the lower courts.
Yet the Court's failure to offer further guidance on the appropriate limits
of the "same conduct" test betrayed the Court's disinclination to fashion
a consistent application of the standard.
III. UITED STATES V. DIXON
United States v. Dixon73 involved a defendant who was released on
bond pending his trial for second-degree murder. 74 Dixon's release was
conditional and the commission of "any criminal offense" would subject
him to prosecution for contempt of court .7  Before the murder trial,
Dixon was arrested and indicted for possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute. 76 Following an evidentiary hearing, the judge concluded that
the State had proved the cocaine charge beyond a reasonable doubt and
convicted Dixon of criminal contempt.77 The trial court later dismissed
the cocaine indictment on double jeopardy grounds.78
In a companion case, defendant Foster also raised a double jeop-
69. 493 U.S. 342 (1990). The defendant allegedly wore a ski mask in two separate robberies,
and was acquitted of the first. The Court held that evidence that the defendant wore the ski mask
in the first robbery was admissible at trial for the second, despite the defendant's prior acquittal,
because the standard of proof for the admission of evidence was lower than "beyond a reasonable
doubt." Id. at 348.
70. Id.
71. Felix, 112 S. Ct. at 1384; see United States v. Bayar, 331 U.S. 532 (1947) (holding that
because the essence of a conspiracy crime is the agreement to commit an offense, double jeopardy
did not bar prosecutions for discrediting the military service and conspiring to defraud the U.S.
government based on the same conduct of accepting bribes).
72. Felix, 112 S. Ct. at 1383-84.
73. 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
74. Id. at 2853.
75. Id. The District of Columbia's bail law authorized the judge to impose any condition that
would "reasonably assure... the safety of any other person or the community .... " D.C. CODE
ANN. § 23-1321(a) (1989). The contempt of court sanction was also specifically authorized. D.C.
CODE ANN. § 23-1329(a) (1989).
76. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2853.
77. Id. The District of Columbia allowed contempt sanctions after an expedited hearing
without a jury; the maximum sentence was six months' imprisonment and a $1000 fine. D.C.
CODE § 23-1329(c) (1989).
78. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2853.
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ardy claim after his conviction for contempt of court. Based on allega-
tions of domestic abuse, Foster's wife obtained a civil protection order
(CPO) requiring that he not molest, assault, or threaten her.79 During the
next eight months, Foster's wife alleged sixteen violations of the CPO,
including three instances of threats and two assaults.80 The trial court
held a three-day bench trial in which the court required that in order to
prove the assault violations for criminal contempt purposes, Foster's
wife had to prove two elements: that a CPO existed at the time of the
alleged attacks, and that the assaults "as defined by the criminal code"
took place.8" The court acquitted Foster of the threats, but convicted
him of criminal contempt of court arising from the two assaults.8 2
The U.S. Attorney's Office then obtained an indictment charging
Foster with simple assault, threatening to injure another, and assault
with intent to kill. The first and last charges were based on the events
for which Foster had been found in contempt.8 3 The trial court denied
Foster's motion to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds,
and Foster appealed. 4
The State appealed the trial court's ruling on Dixon's double jeop-
ardy claim, 5 and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals consoli-
dated the Foster and Dixon cases. The appellate court held, in light of
Grady, that the Double Jeopardy Clause mandated dismissal of both
subsequent prosecutions.8 6 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve whether "the Double Jeopardy Clause bars prosecution of a
defendant on substantive criminal charges based upon the same conduct
for which he previously has been held in criminal contempt of court."
8 7
A. The Scalia-Rehnquist Axis: The Demise of Grady
Despite the Justices' division on the scope of the Blockburger-Har-
ris standard, a 5-4 plurality of the Court overruled the "same conduct"
test.88 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Kennedy, wrote that Grady
79. Id. at 2853-54. A CPO could be issued if the complainant established good cause to
believe that the subject was threatening an offense against a family member. D.C. CODE AN.
§ 16-1005(c) (1989).
80. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2854. The most serious allegation was that Foster threw his wife
down the stairs, kicked her, and pushed her head into the floor causing her to lose consciousness.
Id. The other 11 allegations were not relevant to the case.
81. Id.
82. Id. Foster was sentenced to 600 days imprisonment. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. The trial court did not rule on Foster's collateral estoppel claim. Id.
85. Id.
86. United States v. Dixon, 598 A.2d 724, 725 (D.C. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
87. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2854.
88. Id. at 2860.
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should be overruled, but that the element of "violating a contempt order"
could not be considered a separate element under the Blockburger stan-
dard. Convictions that could not be distinguished from the elements
within the contempt order should be overruled. 9 Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, joined by two other Justices, wrote that Grady should be over-
ruled, and that any difference in the elements of a crime, including
violation of a contempt order, allows for multiple prosecutions under the
Fifth Amendment. 90 The remaining four Justices voted to uphold
Grady.9' These dissenters would have dismissed all counts in the sec-
ond prosecutions of Dixon and Foster, except for Justice Blackmun, who
wrote separately to support an exception to the "same conduct" test in
the contempt area.9
2
Both Justice Scalia and Justice Rehnquist overruled Grady because
they claimed the Grady test could not be applied in practice without
creating a broad "same transaction" standard, lacked historical prece-
dent, and caused confusion among the lower courts.93 Both opinions
converge in their abandonment of Grady but differ on the scope of the
standard that remains. Ironically, the same Justices who criticized
Grady for its lack of clarity left the lower courts with a fractured deci-
sion on the current standard.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Was Grady "Unworkable in Practice"?
Any departure from the doctrine of stare decisis demands special
justification.94 The most obvious justification for the quick abandon-
ment of the "same conduct" test would be that the Grady dissenters were
correct that the test was impractical. In the three years that Grady was
good law, however, there was little evidence that the test could not have
been applied without creating a "same transaction" test.95
Justice Scalia used hypotheticals in Grady to show how the "same
conduct" test would bar prosecution in too many cases.96 Justice Scalia
suggested that, if a defendant were prosecuted for burglary, the State
could never subsequently prosecute the defendant for a murder in the
course of that burglary, because the State would have to prove burglary
89. Id. at 2860-64.
90. Id. at 2865-68 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Justices O'Connor and Thomas joined this
opinion.
91. Id. at 2868-2890. Justices Souter, White, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented.
92. Id. at 2879-81 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
93. See id. at 2860; Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 526-44 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
94. See Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984).
95. See Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2889 (Souter, J., dissenting).
96. See Grady, 495 U.S. at 539 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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as a motive for the murder.97 Grady does not necessarily support this
hypothetical result. Justice Scalia failed to distinguish conduct that is
required to prove an element from conduct that is merely persuasive. 98
In fact, the trend in the lower courts before Dixon was to interpret Grady
far more narrowly than the "same transaction" test that Justice Scalia
predicted would be used.99
The other major factor used by the Dixon majority to support its
claim of impracticality was that the test was too confusing for lower
courts to apply.'0° Several commentators had suggested that the need
for a uniform standard was more important than the greater protection
that the Grady test provided. 10 The dissenters vigorously argued that
departure from Grady was not justified merely because two courts of
appeals decisions described it as difficult to apply.' 0 2
Although lower courts did interpret the "same conduct" test in a
variety of ways, Justice Scalia's use of this rationale seems less compel-
ling in light of the high degree of confusion in the double jeopardy area
before Grady.10 3 In fact, some lower courts were confused by Scalia's
dissent in Grady and treated his prediction of an expanded test as an
invitation to interpret Grady broadly.' 04 Almost all of the cases Scalia
used to support his theory that Grady caused too much confusion were
cases involving successive conspiracies, 0 5 an issue that was signifi-
97. See id.
98. See James M. Herrick, Double Jeopardy Analysis Comes Home: The "Same Conduct"
Standard in Grady v. Corbin, 79 Ky. L.J. 864 (1990-91).
99. See Commonwealth v. Woods, 607 N.E.2d 1024, 1028-29 (Mass. 1993) (deciding that
double jeopardy does not bar prosecution for negligent vehicular homicide after acquittal on
drunken driving charges stemming from same crash); State v. Paris, 627 A.2d 582, 590 (N.H.
1993) (holding, based on prior decisions, that enhancing a criminal mischief conviction to a felony
based on use of a firearm and subsequently convicting defendant for violating a firearm statute did
not violate "same conduct" test based on legislative intent).
100. See Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2862-63.
101. See Hickey, supra note 22, at 30-31. A unified Blockburger approach would promote an
alternative to the hypertechnical and fragmented approach to the double jeopardy analysis under
Grady. Id; see also Craig J. Webre, Note, Grady v. Corbin, Successive Prosecutions Must Survive
Heightened Double Jeopardy Protection, 36 LOYOLA L. REv. 1171, 1185 (1991) (arguing that
simplicity and justice could have been achieved by retaining the traditional Blockburger test).
102. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2889 (Souter, J., dissenting). Additionally, the fact that one court
divided the Grady test into four separate clauses does not create enough confusion to justify
ignoring stare decisis. Id.
103. See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1970).
104. Oddly, in State v. Kipi, 811 P.2d 815, 821 (Haw. 1992), the court, referring to Scalia's
apparently facetious warning to prosecutors to start acting as if a "same transaction" test were
good law, held that the "same conduct" test barred a second prosecution. The court made no
serious attempt to work through the "same conduct" test as it was described by the Grady
majority.
105. See Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2863 n.16. Scalia quotes from judges expressing confusion in the
following cases: United States v. Calderone, 917 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1990), (no double jeopardy
bar following conspiracy exception in Felix) vacated and remanded, 112 S. Ct. 1657; United
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cantly clarified by Felix. The other cases Justice Scalia used to support
his conclusion that the test was confusing were cases in which courts
found no double jeopardy by interpreting Grady narrowly. 10 6 Thus, the
decisions of lower court judges who were struggling to develop an appli-
cation of Grady that addressed Justice Scalia's concerns about overpro-
tection of double jeopardy interests were used as a rationale for rejecting
the entire Grady framework.
An examination of the impact of Grady on the cases involving con-
tempt of court illustrates how the Supreme Court could have developed
a narrow "same conduct" jurisprudence instead of overruling Grady out-
right. Justice Scalia rejected the idea of creating an exception to Grady
in the contempt area because the Court could not reasonably apply the
"past practice" exception that it had used in Felix.10 7 While failing to
address why "past practice" is the only appropriate exception, Justice
Scalia explained that the Court cannot apply it because the widespread
use of contempt charges before charging the underlying crime is a rela-
tively new phenomenon. 108 Ironically, this admission undercuts Scalia's
argument that the appropriate standard for double jeopardy should be the
standard existing at the time of the framing of the Constitution.
In fact, several lower courts created exceptions to Grady in the con-
tempt area by holding that certain exigent circumstances justified a suc-
cessive prosecution. 10 9 In Commonwealth v. Aikins,110 the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania held that a defendant's prior conviction of con-
tempt for violating a "Protection From Abuse Order" did not preclude a
subsequent burglary conviction arising from the same burglary."' The
court reconciled the decision with Grady by using a broad definition of
exigent circumstances.' 2 The Aikins court ruled that the need to protect
women and children and to curb domestic violence outweighed due pro-
cess violations, because the potential victims might not survive the typi-
States v. Prusan, 967 F.2d. 57 (2nd Cir. 1992), (double jeopardy bar to count of conspiracy
reversed in light of Felix) cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 497 (1992).
106. See Sharpton v. Turner, 964 F.2d 1284 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding no double jeopardy bar in
successive prosecutions for fraud and tax evasion by analogizing case to Felix); United States v.
Prusan, 780 F. Supp. 1431 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), rev'd, 967 F.2d. 57 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 497 (1992) (finding no double jeopardy bar on three of the four counts in issue); Eatherton v.
State, 810 P.2d 93 (Wyo. 1991) (finding no double jeopardy bar to successive prosecutions).
107. See Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2863 n.15.
108. Id. at 2863.
109. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Manney, 617 A.2d 817, 818 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
110. 618 A.2d 992 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
Ill. Id. at 993-96.
112. Id. at 994-95. "Grady could not make it more clear ... that double jeopardy may not
deny the right to prosecute the substantive offenses because procedural or administrative
exigencies require more expeditious handling of the summary offense." Id. at 994.
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cal one- to two-year wait for a trial.' 13
The "exigent circumstances" exception also solves the problem of
the double jeopardy bar restricting the ability of a judge to maintain
order in the courtroom when sanctions could preclude future prosecu-
tion. "'14 In one pre-Grady case, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a
non-adversarial summary criminal contempt proceeding, arising out of a
courtroom scuffle in which the defendant punched the prosecutor, did
not bar a successive prosecution for aggravated battery based on the
same act.1'5 By following a reasonable "exigent circumstances" excep-
tion to Grady, the lower courts could have maintained order in the court-
room and protected highly endangered potential victims without
precluding a future prosecution.' 1 6
B. Does Dixon Offer Sufficient Protection of Double Jeopardy
Interests?
The return to the Blockburger standard significantly reduces the
rights of a defendant who is subject to multiple prosecutions. Under
Dixon-Blockburger, the courts would define nine federal narcotics
offenses as separate from each other. 1 7 This would allow the govern-
ment to bring nine separate prosecutions for a single sale of narcotics." 8
Although a prosecutor is unlikely to prosecute nine times, two or three
attempts by a persevering prosecutor is not out of the question." 19
A fundamental error of the Dixon Court is its failure to address
Justice Brennan's theory that double jeopardy interests are implicated at
the outset of a trial, not merely when the verdict is returned. 2 ° Justice
Souter accused the majority of "dismembering the protection against
successive prosecution that the Constitution was meant to provide." "'
Although it is the Court's role to defer to legislative intent with regard to
113. Id. at 995. Justice Blackmun advocated a similar approach in Dixon. See Dixon, 113 S.
Ct. at 2879-80 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
114. An area of confusion for some lower courts was that the term "contempt of court"
encompasses both direct and indirect criminal contempt. Direct criminal contempt is used to
maintain order in the courtroom, and indirect criminal contempt is used to enforce a court's long-
term orders.
115. People v. Totten, 514 N.E.2d 959 (I11. 987).
116. The Aikins case, however, comes dangerously close to allowing the exception swallow the
rule.
117. See Note, Consecutive Sentences in Single Prosecutions: Judicial Multiplication of
Statutory Penalties, 67 YALE L.J. 916, 928 n.43 (1958).
118. If one trial resulted in an acquittal, however, the defendant might be able to invoke
collateral estoppel.
119. See Thomas, supra note 53, at 199.
120. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957); see also supra notes 24-25 and
accompanying text.
121. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2881 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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multiple punishments, 22 it is the judiciary's role to protect against suc-
cessive prosecutions.' 23 The Dixon decision allows the government to
avoid the multiple prosecution bar by creating fine distinctions between
laws prohibiting the same conduct, thus manipulating the definition of
"offense."1 24
Justice Scalia asserted that collateral estoppel and lack of resources
will dissuade prosecutors from bringing multiple prosecutions. Yet the
recent limitations placed on collateral estoppel by Dowling v. United
States125 suggest that the rule will be applied only in rare situations.
Also, his unsupported reliance on a lack of prosecutorial resources is
mere wishful thinking. 126
C. What Double Jeopardy Protection Remains After Dixon?
The Dixon decision reduces the constitutional prohibition against
successive prosecutions to a minimum. In the post-Dixon case of United
States v. Liller, 27 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals overturned a
double jeopardy bar that was based on Grady.12  The Liller court held
that the double jeopardy clause did not bar the government from prose-
cuting a defendant for possession of a firearm by a felon despite his
prior prosecution for knowingly transporting the same weapon in inter-
state commerce. 129 What would have been a close question under Grady
was now considered "straightforward" by the court.' 30  The court
acknowledged that Justice Scalia's opinion in Dixon may require the
court to look beyond a strict statutory comparison and examine the facts
alleged in the indictments. '3' The Liller court held that the statutes were
clearly distinct and, even if the court examined the facts, each charge
required proof of a fact that the other did not.' 32 This analysis suggests
that lower courts will recognize the strong limitations placed on the
double jeopardy bar, but will require successive prosecutions to prove a
slightly different set of facts in order to retain a minimal judicial review
122. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368 (1983).
123. See United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669-70 (1896).
124. See Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2882 (Souter, J.).
125. 493 U.S. 342 (1990); see supra note 69.
126. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2877 (White, J., dissenting).
127. 999 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1993).
128. Id. at 62.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 63.
131. Id. The court noted that, in Dixon, four or possibly five Justices examined the court order
violated by the defendants rather than the more general statutory elements of the criminal
contempt provision. Id.
132. Id. The new charge required proof that the defendant was a felon and the old charge
required that the firearm was stolen and transported interstate. Id.
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of the government's acts.1 33
Most, if not all, of the cases that failed the "same conduct" test
would survive a double jeopardy challenge under Dixon. In one pre-
Dixon case, a defendant was sentenced to a six-month jail term for crim-
inal contempt based on his refusal to testify in a homicide investiga-
tion. 34 The State then charged him with two counts of hindering
prosecution in the first degree, which the court dismissed based on the
Grady test.1 35 Despite the fact that these subsequent charges are based
on exactly the same conduct, Dixon would allow them, based on either
the lack of a contempt order in the second prosecution or the distinctions
between the elements needed to prove a "refusal to testify" and "hinder-
ing prosecution." '36
Justice Scalia narrowly expanded the Blockburger test to a "Block-
burger-plus" approach by stating that, under Harris v. Oklahoma, the
element of a violated contempt order is not considered an additional ele-
ment to the underlying crime.' 37 However, Scalia also narrowed the
scope of Harris by making it possible for a defendant to be tried twice
for the same offense as long as it is a lesser included offense. For exam-
ple, a defendant may be acquitted of simple assault and then tried for
assault with intent to kill, allowing the jury to return with a conviction of
assault as a lesser included offense. Despite the extremely broad discre-
tion this gives prosecutors, Justice Scalia asserted that this example
"merely illustrates the unremarkable fact that one offense (simple
assault) may be an included offense of two offenses (violation of the
CPO for assault, and assault with intent to kill) that are separate offenses
under Blockburger."'138
Chief Justice Rehnquist, who offered an even narrower reading of
Harris, asserted that Scalia was actually applying a "same conduct"
analysis by going beyond a simple examination of statutes to compare
the facts of specific contempt orders to the subsequent charges.1 39 Using
what Justice White termed a "hypertechnical and archaic approach,"1 0
133. The Rehnquist bloc in Dixon would not support any analysis beyond a statutory
comparison. See Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2865-68. It is unlikely that this view will secure a majority
of the Court.
134. State v. Mojarro, 816 P.2d 260, 260 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
135. Id. at 260-61.
136. If there are absolutely no distinctions between the elements or facts required, the second
prosecution might be barred under the current standard.
137. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2857.
138. Id. at 2859 n.7.
139. Id. at 2865-66. Scalia, who bitterly criticized the Court for arbitrarily interpreting the
constitutional text in Grady, offers no support for his proposition that the condition of being on
probation should not be considered a separate element under Blockburger.
140. Id. at 2877, (quoting from Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444 (1970)).
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the majority interpreted Harris as standing for the narrow proposition
that no violation of double jeopardy occurs if there is any additional
element added to a lesser offense in a subsequent prosecution. Although
Foster's assault charge cannot be abstracted from the element of con-
tempt for violating a court order not to commit assault, the majority
asserted that assault with intent to kill is sufficiently distinct from the
contempt conviction to avoid the double jeopardy bar. 41
The Rehnquist bloc also narrowly interpreted Harris to stand for
the idea that unless a statute specifically mentions a lesser crime, a court
may not bar multiple prosecutions of greater and lesser offenses. For
example, commission of a felony will necessarily fulfill an element of
felony-murder, but the commission of an assault will not fulfill an ele-
ment of a contempt statute unless that statute contains assault as an ele-
ment of contempt.' 42 Ultimately, Chief Justice Rehnquist interpreted
Harris as standing at its core for the proposition that any felony is a
lesser included offense of felony-murder and that examination beyond
the statutory language is unnecessary. 43
The Scalia-Rehnquist analysis is problematic in two areas. First,
neither Justice explains how the Fifth Amendment prohibits successive
prosecutions when a lesser crime is incorporated by statute into a greater
crime, as in Harris, but allows successive prosecutions when the greater
crime does not specifically mention the lesser crime. Under this analy-
sis, Blockburger is purely a test of statutory construction. This allows
the legislature to create and prosecute as many variations of an offense
as it wishes.
Second, Justice Scalia's claim that the Framers never meant to
extend double jeopardy beyond a comparison of statutes is dubious.'"
At the time of the framing of the Constitution, there were far fewer stat-
utes, so that "same offense" was the equivalent of "same culpability."' 45
The "same conduct" test merely reasserts the protection that defendants
were always meant to have: being prosecuted only once for each illegal
act.
V. CONCLUSION
The Dixon decision is a retreat from the judiciary's role as protec-
tor of individual rights against potential abuses of power by the legisla-
ture. Twenty-five years ago, Justice Stewart wrote that the extraordinary
141. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2859.
142. Id. at 2867.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
144. See Grady, 495 U.S. at 527-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
145. See Thomas, supra note 53, at 207.
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proliferation of overlapping and related criminal statates required the
Court to look beyond statutory comparisons to define "same offense" in
a way that reflected reality.'46 The trend toward overlapping and highly
technical new offenses has increased since then. Grady was a reason-
ably coherent attempt to breathe life into a Fifth Amendment right by
reasserting the judiciary's role as the interpreter of what constitutes a
"same offense." Dixon allows legislatures to create constitutionally dis-
tinct offenses by adding a minor element to a crime without changing
the nature of the act.
As a matter of constitutional theory, Dixon is both premature and
unsound. The majority's cavalier approach to stare decisis is not justi-
fied by the greater simplicity of the Blockburger test. Additionally, the
Dixon Court's fractured holding creates the problem of conflicting inter-
pretations by lower courts.
In the future, the Court may explore alternative expansions of
double jeopardy protection.' 47 Possible tests include a "same transac-
tion" test, which is easier to apply than the "same conduct" test and
gives defendants broad protection against successive prosecutions. An
innovative alternative is the "life or limb" test, which limits the applica-
tion of the "same transaction" test to "grave" offenses that allow for
incarceration.1 18 This may have broader appeal to the Court because it
avoids some unjust results stemming from greater protection such as the
dismissal of the vehicular homicide count in Vitale.149
The future of double jeopardy protection rests precariously with the
swing votes on the Court. Because four Justices supported the expan-
sive protection of Grady and three supported complete deference to the
legislature, the future definition of "same offense" lies in the hands of
Justice Scalia's "Blockburger-plus" approach. That approach is far
closer to the Rehnquist bloc than it is to the pro-Grady dissenters. This
suggests that only a minimal degree of scrutiny will be applied to future
successive prosecutions. The Dixon decision is a small step forward for
a uniform double jeopardy standard but a large step backward for judi-
cial enforcement of Fifth Amendment rights.
SCOTT STORPER
146. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 n.10 (1970).
147. Although its advantages outweighed its problems, the Grady test rested on shaky ground
from the start. If the Grady Court had elaborated on the structure and goals of the test rather than
justifying it mainly through an attack on Blockburger, the test would have been less vulnerable.
148. This test was developed by Professor George C. Thomas III. See Thomas, supra note 53,
at 217-18.
149. See Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 419-20 (1980).
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